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POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

Second progress report on the implementation of the Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its resumed forty-fourth session, held between 12 and 14 September 1990, the General Assembly considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/44/960 and Add.1-2), which had been requested by it in its Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (annex to resolution S-16/1 of 14 December 1989). That report included the findings of the mission dispatched to South Africa by the Secretary-General to obtain firsthand information on the latest developments in the country.

2. Taking careful note of the report of the Secretary-General, the General Assembly adopted by consensus, on 17 September 1990, resolution 44/244 on the policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa. In paragraph 10 of the resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to remain actively seized of developments in South Africa and to submit to the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly a report on further progress made in the implementation of the Declaration. The present report is submitted in compliance with that request.

3. To prepare the report, the Secretariat sought the views of the Government, all political parties, movements and organizations, as well as several other interlocutors whom the United Nations team met in South Africa in June 1990. They were requested to transmit by 15 August 1991 their views on the overall situation in South Africa and on any progress achieved in the implementation of the Declaration. An analysis, based primarily on those views, is contained in annex I to the present report.

4. The Secretary-General had the opportunity, on a number of occasions during the year, of discussing with the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations developments relating to the situation in South Africa, in particular, initiatives and measures undertaken by the Government. The Secretary-General also met with the President of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr. Nelson Mandela, and the President of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Mr. Clarence Makwetu, who provided him with an assessment of the situation and the position of their movements on some of the changes covered by the Declaration.

5. In addition, the Secretary-General drew certain provisions of the resolution to the attention of the United Nations organs and specialized agencies concerned, in particular the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Details on the steps taken to implement such provisions will be reported to the General Assembly.

II. OBSERVATIONS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

6. Over the last 12 months the process towards the end of apartheid in South Africa, although halting, remained on course. A most notable development was the repeal of major apartheid legal structures. Regrettably, the wave of violence that engulfed the country during the period became a severe test of confidence and a serious obstacle to the evolving political dialogue. As several measures necessary for a climate for negotiations as well as peace initiatives have been undertaken recently, South Africa appears to be moving ahead again towards the beginning of substantive negotiations.

7. The complex process of change in which South Africa is presently engaged inevitably gives rise to reaction and political antagonisms. Such reaction has been manifest in a variety of ways, from violent acts by those opposing the democratic transformation of the country or wishing to obtain political advantage prior to negotiations to less overt activities by elements connected with the system. In this respect, the impartiality of the security forces has been called into question and the potential for destabilization by extremist groups remains a cause for concern.

8. While the most basic laws of apartheid, as promised, were removed by last June, many of the concomitant attitudes and practices, as indeed the consequences of those laws, do persist. Delays in the implementation of the necessary measures envisaged by the Declaration to create a climate for negotiations, particularly with regard to political prisoners and exiles, the perceived ineffectual response to violence and disclosures of secret funding of organizations led to tensions and a crisis of confidence in the government structures.

9. Yet a number of initiatives taken in the recent period, specifically to deal with violence, hold the promise that the momentum that started more than a year ago could regain strength. It is hoped that in the next few months, following the outcome of the peace initiative sponsored by religious and business leaders, steps will be taken towards an agreement regarding the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of transitional arrangements.

10. At the same time, this process may be relatively lengthy, and even vulnerable, and it may be affected by the magnitude of the socio-economic inequalities that persist in South Africa and the inadequacy of the measures taken so far to address them effectively. While the Government has introduced a number of positive measures, the problems facing the majority of South Africans are so vast that they require a comprehensive national programme of redress. The private sector would be required to play a more important role than it has until now. The serious socio-economic cleavages and the persistent negative attitudes towards change will have to be overcome so that the conditions of life of the disadvantaged sectors can be perceptibly improved. Access to the media and a sustained effort aimed at informing the public about the effects of apartheid on the majority population might contribute to building a consensus on the need to address these problems as early as possible.

11. On the positive side, the broad consensus that human rights must be protected in a democratic South Africa is encouraging. In this connection, the ratification of the International Covenants on Human Rights would be a significant step.

12. There appears also to be a growing convergence of the views of the parties concerned on a number of basic principles of a new constitution. However, the mechanism to draft a new constitution and the necessary arrangements for the transition to a democratic order are still to be agreed upon. It is encouraging that proposals on these matters are being elaborated and that a widening range of South African leaders are realizing that there is no other realistic option than to gather together and negotiate on a democratic, non-racial future for their country.

13. A meeting of all parties concerned to discuss and agree on these matters, as foreseen in the Declaration, now appears to be at the top of the political agenda. Such a meeting could go a long way towards resolving outstanding issues regarding the atmosphere for negotiations and free political activity, and, by itself, could serve as a confidence-building measure. Certainly, there are eminent persons in the country who inspire general trust, for instance, from the religious, academic, labour and business sectors, who can play an important role in the transitional period.

14. The response of the international community needs to be finely tuned to this complex and delicate process. As the Declaration envisages, encouragement, pressure and assistance would need to be suitably applied as the process unfolds, bearing in mind that the ultimate objective is the establishment of a non-racial democracy in South Africa.

15. The United Nations system, in addition to its contribution in connection with the return of exiles, is preparing a concerted response to requests for assistance, particularly from disadvantaged sectors of the society. Furthermore, the Secretary-General stands ready, when requested by the South Africans themselves and the international community, to help in the promotion of the process and in the provision of assistance during the transitional period and beyond.

ANNEX I

Analysis of the information submitted to the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa

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I. PREFACE

1. To facilitate the measurement of progress towards the dismantlement of apartheid, the present report used as a starting-point the situation as it existed in South Africa in June 1990.

2. In all areas, the report is based on the written submissions provided to the Secretariat by 30 August 1991 by the Government as well as by a number of political parties and movements and other concerned organizations. 1/ In many cases, these submissions were supplemented by official statements and press releases. No attempt has been made to reconcile any conflicting information submitted to the Secretariat.

II. BACKGROUND

3. The present section contains a chronological review of major political developments in South Africa from mid-1990 until August 1991. Such information provides the context in which to assess the progress that has been made in the implementation of the provisions of the Declaration.

4. Since the visit of the United Nations team to South Africa in June 1990, the process of change in that country has made a perceptible although not steady progress towards negotiations on a new constitution. The process of creating a climate conducive to negotiations, outlined in the five steps stipulated by the Declaration, has had mixed results. A political space has opened in South Africa allowing previously banned organizations to engage in political activity. However, that activity has been considerably affected by the persisting political violence. National and local initiatives to end the violence have, until recently, achieved only limited success. Although the dismantlement of the apartheid system is under way with the repeal of the major legal pillars of apartheid, there is no unanimity on the most effective measures necessary to address the socio-economic inequalities. These issues notwithstanding, the focus has shifted to the structures in which constitutional negotiations will be conducted, namely, the mechanism to draw up a new constitution and the modalities necessary to effect the transition.

5. In that context, a series of developments in South Africa in 1990 and 1991 need to be highlighted. It may be recalled that in May 1990, the Government and ANC adopted the Groote Schuur Minute, which, among other things, addressed the issues of the release of political prisoners and the granting of immunity for political offences. Subsequently, in August 1990, both parties adopted the Pretoria Minute, according to which the Government undertook to review emergency and security matters, while ANC suspended armed actions.

6. Signalling the spread of violence from the province of Natal to other areas of the country, at least 30 persons were killed on 22 July 1990 at Sebokeng, Transvaal province.

7. In October 1990, a major pillar of apartheid was removed when the Discriminatory Legislation Regarding Public Amenities Repeal Act came into effect. Meanwhile, the state of emergency was lifted in the province of Natal, while the National Party opened its ranks to all races.

8. In November 1990, the National Conference of Church Leaders in South Africa adopted the Rustenburg Declaration in which they stated their "unequivocal rejection of apartheid as a sin" and the need for restitution to the victims of apartheid.

9. In December 1990, PAC held its first national conference in South Africa since 1959. It called for a constituent assembly to devise a new constitution and for the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations. In the same month, ANC held a national consultative conference, which concluded that internal and external pressure needed to be maintained on South Africa until a new constitution was adopted. The conference decided that ANC would suspend the entire negotiation process if all obstacles, including the violence, were not removed by 30 April 1991. The Azanian Peoples' Organization (AZAPO) also held its congress in December.

10. As the violence reached serious proportions, ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) held a summit at Durban on 29 January 1991 to address the issue.

11. In a major undertaking, President F. W. de Klerk announced on 1 February 1991 that the basic laws of apartheid would be repealed during the current session of Parliament. He issued a Manifesto for the New South Africa, stating that the new nation should be based on justice.

12. On 14 February 1991, the Parliament adopted amendments to the Labour Relations Amendment Act, following tripartite negotiations involving the South African trade union movement, namely, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), as well as the employers' organization, the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs (SACCOLA), and the Government.

13. To stress its concern at the violence, on 5 April 1991 ANC addressed an open letter to President de Klerk calling on the Government to fulfil a series of demands by 9 May 1991 concerning political violence, and stating that otherwise ANC would suspend any further discussion or exchange with the Government. On 16 April, ANC and PAC agreed to convene a conference of patriotic forces, scheduled for September 1991, to seek the unity of all democratic forces in South Africa.

14. On 18 April 1991, the Government announced a 10-point plan to address the issue of political violence, including the convening of a conference on violence and intimidation and the establishment of a standing commission of inquiry into the prevention and ending of violence. Later, the Government banned the use of "traditional weapons" in designated "unrest areas".

15. On 18 May 1991, ANC stated that since the violence was a threat to negotiations, it would not involve itself in discussions with the Government on any constitutional issues. It expressed support for the initiative of religious leaders to convene a broad-based peace conference and announced a plan of mass action to back the demands of the open letter.

16. By 30 April 1991, many political prisoners remained in jail, leading more than 200 of them to undertake a hunger strike. Some were hospitalized as a result of the strike.

17. An open letter was sent by PAC, on 22 May 1991, in response to President de Klerk's invitation to the organization to attend the Conference on Violence. Underlining the fact that the ongoing violence had been "directed primarily at communities which are highly politicized", PAC pledged to work with other political organizations in a bid to end the violence.

18. The basic laws of apartheid were repealed on 5 June 1991, namely, the Black Land Act, No. 27, of 1913; the Development Trust and Land Act, No. 18, of 1936; the Group Areas Act, No. 36, of 1966; and the Black Communities Development Act, No. 4, of 1984. Measures required to address the inequalities created by such laws are under discussion. The Population Registration Act, No. 30, of 1950 was abrogated on 17 June 1991, although the population register will remain until a new constitution is adopted. On 21 June, the Internal Security Act, No. 74, of 1982 was amended.

19. The sixteenth conference of IFP, which was held in June 1991, re-elected Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi as President.

20. On 22 June 1991, religious leaders, in cooperation with business leaders, facilitated the convening of a peace summit, which included some of the major parties to the political violence. As a result, a preparatory committee, including the Government, ANC and IFP, was established for what became known as the National Peace Initiative.

21. ANC held its national conference in July 1991, during which resolutions were adopted on, inter alia, negotiations, foreign policy, strategy and tactics, and the issue of violence. The conference provided the ANC leadership with a mandate to pursue negotiations with the Government. Concerning foreign policy, ANC resolved that "sanctions must be used creatively in order to arrest the erosion that has occurred".

22. Later, in July, several government Ministers acknowledged that public funds had been used secretly to assist the activities of political organizations, in particular IFP and the IFP-aligned United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). Widespread concerns were raised about the impact of this funding on such issues as political intolerance and violence in the country. Subsequently, the Government announced a set of measures in connection with the use of public funds to assist political organizations, including changes in the portfolios of several Ministers and the revision of legislation pertaining to the use of secret funds.

23. The Fourth National Congress of COSATU, which was also held in July, called for a summit of anti-apartheid organizations to press, through mass action, for the Government's resignation and the installation of an interim government in the light of the acknowledgment of the secret use of public funds.

24. The National Peace Initiative released a draft national peace accord on 14 August 1991, which provides for, inter alia, codes of conduct both for political parties and organizations and for the security forces, as well as a monitoring mechanism. After its consideration by political and other organizations, the draft accord will be submitted for adoption by a national convention scheduled to be held on 14 September 1991. The draft accord is regarded as a confidence-building measure both in helping end the violence and in urging forward the process on negotiations.

25. On 16 August 1991, the Government and UNHCR agreed on a plan for the voluntary repatriation of an estimated 40,000 South African refugees and political exiles. The agreement formally establishes the first United Nations presence in South Africa.

26. The public debate on constitutional issues is acquiring momentum as political parties and movements have issued proposals concerning a new constitution for South Africa. In that context, the debate on these issues is no longer at an incipient stage, but rather it has become a dynamic process engaging a wide cross-section of South African political opinion.

27. Throughout 1990 and 1991, political parties and movements as well as concerned organizations have conducted mass campaigns to press for negotiations and a democratic constitution. While demanding the release of all political prisoners and the return of all exiles, they have also called for an elected constituent assembly that would draw up a new constitution. Recently, following acknowledgments by the Government of the secret funding of political organizations, demands for an interim government have increased.

28. A more detailed discussion of these issues, as well as the views of political parties and movements and other organizations on them, is presented below.

III. PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS CREATING A CLIMATE OF NEGOTIATIONS

A. Release of all political prisoners and detainees

29. In paragraph 6 (a) of the Declaration, the General Assembly calls on the South African Government to "release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them". Beginning in February 1990, steps were taken by the Government to release prisoners sentenced for membership in previously banned organizations, or for acts which were illegal because the organization was banned; the Government

also lifted restrictions on previously released prisoners (see A/44/960, annex I, para. 42).

Definition of political offences

30. In the Groote Schuur Minute of 4 May 1990, the Government and ANC decided to establish a working group to make recommendations, inter alia, on a definition of political offences in the South African situation that would be applicable to those inside and outside South Africa, bearing in mind similar experiences in Namibia and elsewhere (see A/45/268). The working group in its 21 May 1990 report agreed on certain principles and factors to form the basis of guidelines to meet the South African situation. Two types of political offences were envisaged. Firstly, there were certain "purely" political offences, like treason, not involving a common or "ordinary" crime such as murder or assault; or the dissemination of subversive literature. Secondly, the report also recognized that in certain circumstances a "common" crime, even a serious one, such as murder, could be regarded as a political offence and seven principal factors were set out that were commonly taken into account in national courts in making such a determination. These factors related to the motive of the offences; the context in which the offence was committed; the nature of the political objective; the legal and factual nature of the offence, including its gravity; the object of the offence; the relationship between the offence and the political objective being pursued; and the question whether the act was committed in the execution of an order or with the approval of the organization, institution or body concerned (see annex). 2/

31. The Government and ANC, in the Pretoria Minute of 6 August 1990, accepted the working group's report and agreed on a timetable for the release of prisoners in various categories and set the latest date envisaged for the completion of the total task in terms of the Working Group's report at not later than 30 April 1991. A further working group was established to draw up a plan for the release of ANC-related prisoners. The Government reserved its right to talk to other organizations about their prisoners. 2/

32. In the Government Gazette of 7 November 1990, the Department of Justice, referring to the working group set up pursuant to the Groote Schuur Minute, published guidelines for defining political offences in South Africa, established the process of granting pardon and indemnity, and dealt with the issues of temporary immunity and entry into the Republic. The guidelines for defining political offences followed the seven factors set out in the report of the working group, as summarized above, but omitted the distinction between "purely" political offences and "ordinary" crimes, which, in accordance with the working group's report, could be considered political offences. 3/ On 9 November 1990, a further Government Gazette spelt out the composition, powers and functions of the consultative bodies on indemnity; the final decision was left to the State President. 4/

33. During the first months of 1991, concern was expressed by ANC, the Political Prisoners Release Programme of the Lawyers for Human Rights and the Human Rights Commission in South Africa that the agreements of the Government

regarding the release of political prisoners were not being fulfilled. As the 30 April target date neared, unreleased political prisoners began a hunger strike.

Release of prisoners

34. According to the Government, by 30 April 1991 only 1,102 applications for release had been received. At the request of the Government, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), between 6 and 21 May 1991, brought the release programme to the attention of each South African prisoner. 5/ As a result, the Government received over 5,000 additional applications, mostly from prisoners serving sentences for common law crimes, several hundred of which merited consideration. The Government further reported receiving lists of political prisoners from the Human Rights Commission in South Africa (1,292 names) and ANC (462 names). According to the Government, 260 persons from the list submitted by the Human Rights Commission and 128 from the ANC list were in South African prisons, mostly for serious offences. (Lists with details of sentences and offences were annexed to the submission of the Government.) 5/

35. In its submission to the Secretariat, the Government stated that 1,145 prisoners claiming political status had been released. According to the Human Rights Commission, as at 31 May 1991, 1,013 political prisoners had been released. 6/ In the Government's view all prisoners with a legitimate claim to political status within the meaning and spirit of the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes had been released; a virtual general amnesty had been declared excluding only cases of murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault.

36. The Government further reported on an agreement signed by its representatives and ANC on 30 June 1991 to the effect that finality in the process of the release of prisoners had been reached and that 15 July 1991 had been set as the deadline for new applications. The agreement noted that a large number of prisoners did not qualify for release according to the categories and guidelines, and in that regard the agreement took cognizance of government proposals for special remission of sentences. The following day special remission of sentences was granted to a broad spectrum of prisoners (whether they claimed to be political prisoners or not), excluding life sentences, sexual offenders and child abusers. The Government reported that a large number of persons who did not qualify for release as political prisoners because of the gravity of their offences had benefited from this reduction of sentence.

37. A number of organizations transmitted to the Secretariat their views that political prisoners were still being held in detention in South Africa and they criticized the procedures and definitions used by the Government. At the end of July 1991, according to the Human Rights Commission, 946 known political prisoners were still being held; 3 began serving their sentences in July, 166 were held in the homeland of Bophuthatswana and 730 were classified as "unrest prisoners" having been sentenced for intimidation or public violence during mass community protests. In addition, 17 prisoners were under sentence of death for politically related reasons. 7/

38. ANC, PAC, the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the Human Rights Commission and others have criticized the apparent unilateral exclusion from release by the Government of prisoners held for violent crimes when the agreement of 21 May 1990 specifically provided that "ordinary" crimes, even murder, could be, under certain circumstances, considered political offences. ANC stated that the Government had narrowed the original guidelines on political prisoners, excluding the unrest-related prisoners, which was one of the major reasons for the difference in figures given by the Government and those of ANC and the Human Rights Commission. 8/ Similarly, PAC stated that "not all political prisoners have been released" and that the Government "has given its own definition of political prisoners and ... thousands ... remain in prison as a result". Reference was made to some of the Sharpeville Six and Upington 14. 9/ From the point of view of PAC, political prisoners were all those who engaged in the struggle against apartheid, including combatants imprisoned for guerrilla activities and those charged for public violence in furtherance of the struggle against apartheid. 9/

39. The method used by the Government in granting special remission of sentence to the general prison population, rather than dealing specifically with politically motivated crimes, was also criticized, among others, by the Human Rights Commission, since, although a substantial number of political prisoners were in fact freed, a large number of criminal prisoners were released unnecessarily. 10/ In addition, the fact that decisions of granting political prisoner status were ultimately in the hands of the Government was criticized. 11/ It was also felt that the Government could not avoid responsibility for the prisoners held in Bophuthatswana. In this regard, the Human Rights Commission argued that the "so-called independent State of Bophuthatswana, a 'country' composed of seven discrete pieces of land scattered over three different provinces of South Africa, is clearly the artificial creation of the apartheid government, which cannot avoid ultimate responsibility". In addition, the Commission pointed out that the prisoners had been arrested as a result of the intervention of South African armed forces. 6/

40. SACC stated that it was still engaged in making representations to the Government on the release of prisoners. It expressed its concern over the way in which the matter of the release had been handled and underlined the adverse psychological impact on the prisoners of the procrastination in their release.

41. While a large number of political prisoners have been released, there is no consensus at present on whether all such prisoners have been released. One of the causes of this problem may be found in a lack of communication and transparency with regard to individual cases. It has been suggested that a procedure, beginning with the establishment and checking of one list of alleged political detainees, be agreed upon. Disputed cases, if any, could be referred to a panel of independent experts or possibly an independent jurist for fact-finding and recommendations. Such a procedure might also be useful with regard to detentions under security legislation and new trials allegedly for political offences.

Return of exiles

42. The return of persons from exile and refugees has also been seen as an important element in creating conditions for negotiations. With regard to the question of indemnity and return of expatriates, the Government informed the Secretariat that, as at 19 August 1991, 7,246 applications for indemnity had been approved out of a total of 8,713 received, only 179 having been rejected. On 16 August 1991, after lengthy and detailed negotiations, the Government of South Africa and UNHCR initialled a Memorandum of Understanding on voluntary repatriation and reintegration of South African returnees. UNHCR was charged with organizing the repatriation operation, was authorized to open temporary offices in South Africa to assist in the process of repatriation and reintegration and will have free and unhindered access to the returnees in South Africa; the returnees themselves would enjoy complete freedom of movement. 12/

43. The Government in that Memorandum expressed its willingness, in the interest of the process of reconciliation and in order to expedite the rate of repatriation, to grant amnesty to returnees for political offences committed before 8 October 1990 and which qualify for indemnity in terms of the guidelines that were appended to the agreement. Decisions on granting amnesty were the responsibility of the Government, but it was agreed that, before finally refusing an application for indemnity, the Government would take into consideration the recommendations of existing advisory bodies to which UNHCR could make representation on behalf of returnees. Persons granted indemnity could then return, after clearance by the Government, without risk of arrest, detention, imprisonment or legal proceedings in respect of those offences. Procedures for readmission, reception and re-integration were also agreed upon. 12/ It is expected that the Memorandum will be signed in the near future. 13/

44. UNHCR, in announcing the agreement for the safe and dignified return of the refugees and exiles, said that it marked the beginning of the end of a 30-year-long human tragedy and that for South Africa it was a giant step toward the construction of a society where all South Africans would enjoy basic human rights. 13/ The Government for its part referred in its submission to the agreement as a significant event and expressed the hope that the implementation of the agreement would be characterized by a spirit of mutual trust and understanding.

B. Lifting of all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organizations and persons

45. In paragraph 6 (b) of the Declaration, the General Assembly calls on the Government to "lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organizations and persons". In July 1990 the United Nations team that visited South Africa reported to the Secretariat that all organizations and groups met by it in South Africa agreed that the lifting of the bans and restrictions had been the only precondition that had been fully met. Concern was expressed at

that time by some organizations that, despite the removal of the bans, they were not able to organize freely (A/44/960, annex I, paras. 54 and 55).

46. In its submission for the present report, the Government stated that no organizations were at this time banned, proscribed or restricted and that no restrictions or conditions were being imposed on any persons released from prison or detention. It noted further that demonstrations and protest activities were fully tolerated subject only to normal regulations.

47. According to PAC, by imposing conditional indemnity on members of PAC and other organizations, the Government has not fulfilled the precondition of unbanning organizations and of lifting restrictions on persons. PAC stated that in December 1990 members of the external mission attending the PAC conference in South Africa had to leave the country under threat of arrest. 9/

C. Removal of all troops from the townships

48. In paragraph 6 (c) of the Declaration, the General Assembly calls upon the Government to "remove all troops from the townships". According to the Government of South Africa, all troops have been withdrawn from the townships; they now may only be temporarily deployed at the request of the police authorities in certain areas where the police need assistance to maintain order and combat violence. The Government stated that although the Police Force was being strengthened by additional manpower and funds, the widespread incidence of violence in some areas still required the involvement of security forces over and above normal police contingents. As far as the impartiality of the security forces was concerned, steps were taken to redefine their role. The State President said on 30 July 1991:

> On 10 January 1990, I, of my own accord, addressed about 800 senior police officers from all over the country. I spelt it out in no uncertain terms that it was their duty to be absolutely impartial; to refrain from any political involvement; to restrict themselves to combating crime and protecting the lives and property of all South Africans.
>
> On 7 March 1990, I repeated the same exercise with the Defence Force in respect of the necessity of a new approach in view of the new circumstances. 5/

49. COSATU has observed that "apart from regular troops, special forces, including those involved in Angola and Namibia, have been stationed in the townships. These units have been deeply implicated in the atrocities which have been committed". 14/ According to PAC, the Government "has sought to undermine the provisions of this clause by imposing violence on our communities to justify the deployment of troops". 9/